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It has often been stated that the Dutch intelligence and security 
community is tied with silver cords to the United States. 1 Both countries 
have a comparable outlook on world affairs and have common interests. 
For the United States, the Dutch ally was important throughout the Cold 
War, but even today the Netherlands are considered to be "a vital trans-
atlantic anchor" in Europe? Although the Dutch intelligence community 
maintained and maintains good relations with Great Britain, France, 
(West) Germany and Israel, this made Dutch-American bonds 
exceptionally important. The American-Dutch liaison contributed to the 
national and international security of the Netherlands, and increased the 
small country's ability to be involved in world affairs. 
How did this allegedly pro-American tilt within the Dutch intelli-
gence and security community come about and how did it evolve over 
time? One could argue that the general political culture and elite 
depended on and supported the United States, and that this was mirrored 
within the intelligence community. Dutch historians such as Duco 
Hellema have however demonstrated that Dutch interests did collide 
with US politics on several occasions, for example regarding the 
De Graaff B. and Wiebes C., "Intelligence and the Cold War behind the Dikes: the 
Relationship between the American and Dutch Intelligence Communities; 1946-
1994", Intelligence and National Security, 12, 1997, pp. 41-58, here: p. 47; De 
GraaffB., "Dutch-American Intelligence Relations", in Krabbendam H., van Minnen 
C. and Scott-Smith G. (eds.), Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations 1609-
2009, Amsterdam, Boom, 2009, pp. 674-682, here: p. 681. 
2 US Cable "Why Holland is So Important to US", 22 August 2005, 
<http://www.guardian.eo.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/38987> (accessed 
1 March 2012). 
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decolonisation of Indonesia in 1947-1950 and during the New Guinea 
crisis of 1958 and 1961. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs did steer 
its own course, even when this amounted to severe conflicts with the 
US. However, these misgivings were not reflected within the intelli-
gence and security services, who were "allowed to operate in ways that 
diverge slightly from current government policies".3 
What about the intelligence and security services themselves? To 
further explore the American influence in the Dutch security and intelli-
gence domain, this chapter focuses on the relations between the Dutch 
intelligence community and the US and how they changed from the 
Cold War to the post-Cold War era. What were the main issues for 
transatlantic security and intelligence cooperation between the two 
countries? In what way did they diverge from the overriding political-
cultural Zeitgeist? Has the Obama administration caused a re-examina-
tion of the Dutch-US relationship on security matters? In examining 
these questions we will focus mainly on the Dutch security service and 
its transatlantic relations and less on the Dutch intelligence service, the 
two being different organisations during the Cold War. The intelligence 
service and its transatlantic ties have been covered relatively exten-
sively, especially during the 1950s and 1960s period.4 
To explain these processes of continuity and change, two concepts 
are used here: intelligence liaison and political transfer. Intelligence 
liaison entails four different kinds of (transnational) cooperation be-
tween different intelligence agencies: complete intelligence liaison 
(unilateral/bilateral and formal) intelligence support (exchanging 
equipment, advise, training. warnings) operations sharing Goint, allo-
cated, and parallel operations), and intelligence sharing (sharing mostly 
finished intelligence reports V This concept provides a framework with 
which we can explain how and why close bonds between the US and the 
Netherlands evolved and changed over time. 
The political transfer concept includes the import, adaptation and in-
sertion of a certain policy perspective, strategy or measure of one coun-
4 
De Graaff, "Dutch-American Intelligence Relations", p. 674. 
Commission for the Supervision of the Intelligence and Security Services 
(Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, 
CTIVD), report 22a, Toezichtsrapport inzake de samenwerking van de AIVD met 
buitenlandse inlichtingen- en/ofveiligheidsdiensten, 2009 pp. 18-19. 
Wiebes C., "De problemen rand de international intelligence liaison", Justitiele 
Verke111ringen, 30 2004, pp. 70-82, here: pp. 74-79; Abels P.H.A.M., '1nlichlingen-
en veiligheidsdiensten en terrorismebestrijding" in de Graaf BA., van Reijn J. and 
Muller E. (eds.), Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, Hoofddorp, Kluwer, 2010, 
pp. 205-224, here: pp. 219-220. 
Wiebes, "International Intelligence Liaison", p. 73 . 
202 
Beatrice de Graaf & Constant Hijzen 
try into another country's policy. Political transfer theory focuses on the 
international transfer and diffusion of political practices, looking into 
factors such as transmitters, receivers, and communication channels.
6 
It 
theorises the question as to what degree one political culture was influ-
enced by another and how this came about. Intelligence agencies insti-
tutionalised to a large degree after World War 11, a process that often 
involved copying, imitating, or being influenced by each other' s 
systems of organisation, oversight, budgets, operational practices and 
powers. 7 This holds true for the American services which learned a great 
deal from their British counterparts (the British were the first to possess 
effective intelligence and security services), but especially for the post-
war Dutch security service. While the British influence was great in the 
early post-war years, it made way for American influence in the years 
thereafter. 
The Origins of Dutch-American Intelligence Liaison 
The first intelligence contacts between the Netherlands and the 
United States took place during World War 11. The United States, 
involved in the war since the attacks in Pearl Harbour, established its 
frrst intelligence agency in June 1942: the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS). The OSS in London started cooperating with the Dutch Bll!eau 
oflntelligence (BI), founded at the end of 1942, a bureau for coordinat-
ing and carrying out intelligence operations in occupied Europe. How-
ever, for the Dutch, cooperation with the British security service (~5) 
and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, or MI6) were of far greater rm-
portance during the war, because the Dutc~ ~ere tot~lly dependent o!l 
the British services for their know-how, trammg, eqmpment, commum-
cation, and cooperation (in short, for almost everything).
8 
The British influence remained during the liberation and immediate 
post-war transitional period when the Dutch .military au~o~ty was 
entrusted with maintaining the security of the hberated temtones, and 
on British instigation the Bureau for National Security was erected, 
which detected German espionage and guarded against communist 
agitation. This bureau was succeeded by two different organisations: the 
Foreign Intelligence Service, established in January 1946, and the 
Central Security Service (CVD). The organisational structure and the 
Te Velde H., "Transfer: an Introduction", European Review of History, 12, 2005, 
pp. 205-221, here: pp. 209-209. 
Ibid., p. 217. 
Engelen D., "Mars door de tijd van een institutie: beknopte geschiedenis van de 
AIVD", in De Graaf et al., Inlichlingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, pp. 59-70, here: 
pp. 59-63. 
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political embedding (a small and agile organisation without executive 
powers concentrating on supplying the executive with intelligence on 
espionage and threats to the democratic order and state security) were 
directly transferred from Britain to the Netherlands.9 
After a few years, British dominance in the Dutch intelligence and 
security domain gave way to closer intelligence cooperation with the 
Americans. Already in the founding of the Dutch security service, the 
American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was a model with its 
centralised filing cabinet system and counter-intelligence strategies.10 
The cooperation between the Dutch security service CVD (in 1949 
renamed BVD, Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst), and "Karel", as the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) became known in Dutch intelligence 
circles, reached maturity in 1949-1950.11 
In 1948 the rise of communist power and influence in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Berlin increased the Western fear of a communist 
advance, not only in Eastern Europe, but through the popularity of 
communist parties, also in the West. The Czech coup painted a 
frightening picture of how dangerous the communist "fifth column" 
could be. Czechoslovakia had been a country with a long democratic 
tradition. If this stable system could be toppled by communists, they 
perceived, other European countries like Italy or France could fall pray 
as easily. US President Harry Truman therefore appealed to Congress on 
17 March 1948 to support a new national security programme. He 
defmed the communist coup in Prague not only as a regional setback, 
but also as a threat to the free West in general. 12 
American containment policy led the CIA to launch programmes to 
combat communism on a global scale, and so the CIA was looking for 
friends. In terms of capabilities and expertise, the US needed the coop-
eration of (relatively) major services (the British, Canadians, and 
Australians).13 However, smaller countries like Norway and even the 
Netherlands were of interest as well. The CIA had three reasons to 
desire a good intelligence liaison with the Dutch BVD. First, the 
Netherlands was one of the Western countries that could help them to 
get a closer look at communist operation in Europe. How strong was the 
Engelen D., Geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, The Hague, SDU 
Uitgevers, 1996, p. 91. 
10 De Graaff and Wiebes, "Intelligence and the Cold Wax behind the Dikes", p. 43. 
11 Engelen, Geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, p. 296. 
12 Hogan M.J., A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National 
Security State 1945-1954, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 95. 
13 Richelson J.T., The US Intelligence Community, New York, Ballinger, 1989, 
pp. 265-287. 
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Soviet hold on its sentinels in the West? Second, the Netherlands be-
came of strategic importance, since it shifted from its policy of 
neutrality to a policy of international alliances. In 1948 the Netherlands 
eo-founded the Western European Union, and in 1949 it joined the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. East European communist regimes 
laid eyes on Dutch military and political secrets: an American air force 
squadron was stationed at Soesterberg, and nuclear weapons were 
secretly stored near Volkel. As in pre-war times, the Netherlands 
became an important locus of counter-intelligence activities, which gave 
the Western services (through their liaison with the Dutch security 
service) lots of information about the communist intelligence 
requirements (what do they want to know?), their modus operandi (how 
do they try to obtain that information?) and their intelligence assets (the 
actual people involved in the intelligence business ).14 
The third reason for the American interest in a close intelligence re-
lation with the Dutch was the fact that other Western services had 
serious problems at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s. 
The British services were compromised when it became known that the 
Soviet-run "Cambridge five" had penetrated the British services for 
many years, the French services were - because of the Vichy past - not 
yet fully trusted, and the German services were still under 
construction.15 During the war, CIA's predecessor OSS had worked with 
the Dutch resistance in different military operations, and moreover, 
from a CIA perspective, BVD personnel were trustworthy because of 
their past in the resistance. These were men with an unconditional 
loyalty towards one another which made them good security 
personnel.16 
The Dutch had their own motives for and interests in intensifying the 
intelligence liaison with the CIA. Generally speaking intelligence 
liaison is essential to small services, since their resources are relatively 
scarce and they therefore rely on other agencies for their intelligence 
position and know-how vis-a-vis the craft of intelligence. Indeed, as the 
Cold War emerged, American contacts were essential for the Dutch 
agency.17 After a false start (when a Colonel Johnson ran American 
operations on Dutch soil without informing the Dutch security service, a 
faux pas in intelligence liaison), the CIA (founded in 1947) set up its 
14 
De Graaffand Wiebes, "Intelligence and the Cold Wax behind the Dikes", p. 43. 
15 
Andrews C., The Defence of the Realm, pp. 339-349. 
16 
Bentley S., "The Dutch Resistance and the OSS: of Market-Garden and Melanie", 
17 
Studies in Intelligence, 41, 1998, pp. 105-118. 
De Graaff, "Dutch-American Intelligence Relations", pp. 674-677. 
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first branch in the Netherlands in 1948. Terms for cooperation were set 
and relations improved. 18 
Close Bonds: Dutch-American Liaison 1950s-1980s 
Besides multilateral intelligence sharing concerning NATO security, 
the BVD and the CIA developed a bilateral intelligence liaison in three 
domains: intelligence support, intelligence sharing, and operations 
sharing. The intelligence support consisted of an influx of special 
equipment, such as radio communication equipment for surveillance, 
microphones, and wire recorders, but also money, flowing from the CIA 
to the BVD. Although most of the CIA dollars were spent on special 
equipment and fixed costs, a substantial number of BVD-employees 
were de facto on the American payroll, and this direct payment was only 
reduced during the latter half of the 1960s. Another form of intelligence 
support was the training of intelligence officers. Since the beginning of 
the 1950s, the BVD annually sent some of its most excellent 
intelligence officers to Langley, where they were trained by CIA 
officers for a number of weeks. These Dutch intelligence officers not 
only learned the trade from their American colleagues, but also received 
courses on international politics and ideological thinking. As part of 
their training, BVD officers were asked to interview high profile 
intelligence assets, such as the KGB defector Yuri Nosenko. 
In return the BVD shared its intelligence generously with the CIA. 
Unlike the Dutch foreign intelligence service (lnlichtingen Dienst 
Buitenland) where only the head of service maintained liaison with the 
CIA, BVD-CIA relations were of a very informal character. CIA opera-
tives approached Dutch intelligence officers individually, and since no 
formal rules and procedures as to which intelligence was to be shared 
existed, sharing took place by word of mouth. No records of the intelli-
gence shared were kept. It was up to mid-level officers and the chiefs of 
the operational units to decide what kind of intelligence they wanted to 
share with their American counterparts, so there was practically no 
boundary to what was possible~ Former BVD employee Frits Hoekstra 
remembered that up until the end of the Cold War "the most sensitive 
operational source was shared with the CIA". Be it "products of tech-
nical operations, transcripts of microphone-operations" or ''telephone 
taps", everything was "routinely given" to the Americans. 19 
18 
19 
Engelen, Geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, p. 297. 
Hoekstra F., "The Dutch BVD and Transatlantic Co-Operation during the Cold War 
Era: Some Experiences", The Journal of Intelligence History, 3, Summer 2003, 
pp. 46-54, here: pp. 47-49. 
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The Dutch and Americans carried out several joint operations as 
well. One example of this third type of intelligence liaison was 
Project A, a far-reaching counter-intelligence operation starting in the 
early 1950s which entailed the deployment of recording devices in all 
Russian commercial enterprises and the Russian embassy in The Hague. 
The CIA supplied wire recorders and translated the Russian conversa-
tions. The BVD subsequently processed the ''takes" and forwarded 
transcriptions of telephone conversations to the CIA. The BVD, in turn, 
was responsible for the "follow up", whenever the BVD and CIA agreed 
this to be necessary. This could take the form of following and observa-
tion actions, the interception of telephone conversations, and new 
microphone operations.20 
The intelligence, operations, and intelligence sharing paid off. For 
the Americans it was the first and only country in which Soviet activity 
was completely monitored, which provided very valuable intelligence 
about Soviet "shopping lists" and modus operandi. The BVD benefited 
too, for the organisation expanded, its intelligence position improved 
and it professionalised through CIA equipment and training.21 
There were three important consequences to this. In the first place, 
the extensive intelligence support in all its forms contributed to a strong 
dependency of the intelligence sector on US national security perspec-
tives. The intelligence support in the form of training provides the main 
explanation why the BVD's national security paradigm remained so 
solidly fixed on the Cold War and the communist threat: a generation of 
intelligence officials was created that had received training, support and 
world views from the Americans. 
Secondly, Dutch organisational culture changed as it became an end 
in itself to fmd the approval or appreciation of the American agencies. 
Hoekstra, the former BVD employee, remembers that "it was a reason 
for great pride when the CIA station reported that an operation success 
or a political analysis produced by the BVD was brought to the attention 
of the State Department or even the White House". In the organisation 
"it was regarded as almost one of the highest possible rewards in a BVD 
career". 22 
This changed in the 1970s and 1980s. Although anti-American atti-
tudes had surged from time to time over colonial disputes, even within 
the Dutch Foreign Ministry, those sentiments never inhibited the ongo-
ing transfer and liaison on intelligence level. But now, the transatlantic 
20 Engelen, Geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, pp. 298-306. 
21 Engelen D., Frontdienst: de BVD in de Koude Oorlog, Amsterdam, Boom, 2006, 
p. 46. 
22 Hoekstra, "BVD and Transatlantic Co-operation", p. 50. 
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attitudes changed from within. Parallel to societal and political changes, 
gradually a new generation of intelligence officers came to the fore 
within the BVD. These often younger recruits were termed TIMS (a 
reference to the Dutch words for ''young intelligent coworkers") be-
cause they generally had a university degree. This group came into 
conflict with the senior personnel and it took a social worker to reduce 
the tensions inside the BVD organisation. The younger personnel re-
spected different values vis-a-vis the state, the service, and the job, but 
also vis-a-vis the communist threat and the intelligence liaison with the 
CIA. They grew more critical of the way the United States acted in 
Vietnam and Latin America and, from the 1970s on became more 
critical of the blunt and bullying way CIA intelligence officers some-
times acted. 23 
This did not mean - before 1989 - that the intelligence liaison dete-
riorated. When in the 1980s the BVD infiltrated the anti-nuclear peace 
movement, it even allowed CIA officers to collect human intelligence 
within peace activist circles. In the case of Abdul Quadir Khan, the 
Pakistani spy who retrieved through his studies in the Netherlands 
knowledge to set up a gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment programme 
for Pakistan's nuclear deterrence, the CIA successfully pressed the 
Dutch not to prosecute Khan further after his initial arrest in 1986. 
Together with the BVD, it continued to monitor Khan for a longer 
time.24 
However, the emergence of a new generation of intelligence officers 
did lead to a transformation of the intelligence liaison in the long term. 
Political transfer of cultural outlook, psychological warfare techniques 
and ideological outlook were modified to a more critical, less virulent 
anti-communist stance. But it took a radical change in threat perception 
before this new orientation really took shape.25 
Loosening the Cords: 
the "Holiday from History" (1989-2001) 
On 9 November 1989 the Berlin Wall was opened and in subsequent 
months the whole of the Warsaw Pact unravelled. One result not noticed 
at the time was that the Western intelligence community also lost coher-
ence and direction. The perception of an impending communist military 
or political threat was adjusted and an "atomisation of the enemy" 
23 
Engelen, Frontdienst, pp. 59-62. 
24 
"CIA mengde zich in strafzaak tegen Abdul Khan", NOVA tv, 9 September 2005; 
"Nederland liet atoomspion Khan gaan", Nu.nl, 9 August 2005; Argos, 9 August 
2005; De Telegraaf, 7 February 2004. 
25 
Hoekstra, "BVD and Transatlantic Co-operation", pp. 51-52. 
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supplanted the old menace.26 In 1990 the BVD was reorganised, after a 
private consultancy company had written a devastating report about its 
organisation.27 Personnel were cut from 637 in 1990 to 580 in 1993. The 
most far-reaching change however related to the underlying security 
approach. Instead of basing its tasks on perceived threats, the BVD from 
now on took the vital interests that had to be protected as its starting 
points.28 
This new strategy for the BVD conflicted with the tasks set for the 
foreign intelligence service, since the BVD did not follow a purely 
defensive strategy of fending them off but took an offensive stance of 
following the threats back to their source. After some internal scandals 
additionally undermined the foreign service's credibility both at home 
and abroad, Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers decided in February 1992 to 
dismantle the organisation, thereby turning the Netherlands into one of 
the few countries without its own intelligence service. The BVD and the 
military intelligence service took over some tasks, but in essence, non-
military intelligence gathering abroad ground to a halt. This led to some 
unforeseen side-effects, when the British Secret Intelligence Service 
tried to take over complete Eastern European espionage rings through 
former foreign intelligence service staff. The Dutch government was not 
amused and asked theSIS representative to leave the country.29 
This new threat environment nudged the BVD closer towards the 
other European countries, thereby subtly decreasing the liaison with the 
US. Bilateral liaisons with the British, French, German, and Israeli 
intelligence and security services had always been of importance, but as 
the Cold War bonds started to wane, these liaisons gained importance. 
Unilateral liaisons assumed larger importance as well. The TREVI (the 
informal conference of European Community ministers in charge of 
police, justice and security, begun in 1975 as a Dutch initiative to ex-
change information about terrorism), the Schengen Information System 
and Europol now gained momentum. After initial public resistance 
about the possible infringement on individual rights, the Dutch govern-
ment joined Schengen. 30 
26 De Graaff B., "From Security Threat to Perception of Vital Interest. The Changing 
Perceptions of the Dutch Security Service, 1945-1991", Conflict Quarterly, 12, 1992, 
pp. 9-35, here: pp. 20-26. 
27 Trouw, 15 March 1991. 
28 De Graaff, "From Security Threat to Perception of Vital Interest", p. 25. 
29 De Vreij H., "Dutch Spies Back in Business", Radio Netherlands (Wereldomroep), 
21 January 2004. 
30 Daun A., "Intelligence - Strukturen fiir die multilaterale Kooperation europaischer 
Staaten", Integration, 2, April2005, pp. 136-149. 
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What significance did these structural changes have for the intelli-
gence liaison with the US? To start with, some crucial conditions for a 
close liaison changed. As the Cold War ended the overarching threat 
perception of Communism faded. Threat perceptions had to be 
redefined and Dutch and American interests did not coincide anymore, 
especially as economic espionage was gaining in importance. Much of 
the signals intelligence equipment which was used for spying on the 
Russians during the Cold War was now employed for the collection of 
economic intelligence. A further blow to the quid-pro-quo principle that 
underlies intelligence liaisons was the above mentioned decision to 
disband the foreign intelligence service in 1992-1994. Together with the 
personnel cuts at the BVD, the Dutch intelligence community had not 
much to offer anymore, nor was it able to run bilateral intelligence 
operations abroad. 
Only after some time did new interests provide for new liaison and 
transfer opportunities. During the difficult phase of intelligence reor-
ganisation in the early 1990s, the BVD learned from the American FBI 
approach to organised crime and corruption in public administration and 
was able to lift this threat to the status of a national security interest, 
something it had not been before 1989. Drug trafficking and human 
trafficking - important American security interests - became important 
for the BVD as well.31 
During the second half of the 1990s, two common threat perceptions 
and interests emerged once more. The first entailed the preparation and 
carrying out of humanitarian peacekeeping missions, supported by 
intelligence capabilities. For the Dutch, it took a major intelligence 
failure to return at least the military intelligence liaison with allied 
partners to its old pre-1989levels of intensity. The 1995 massacre in the 
Bosnian Muslim enclave of Srebrenica, where Bosnian-Serb forces 
overran Dutch UN peacekeeping troops and subsequently executed an 
estimated 7000 Muslim troops and civilians, drove home to The Hague 
that the lack of an intelligence service with relations to foreign partners 
could have serious consequences on the ground.32 Srebrenica showed 
the dependency on US military and political willingness to assist in 
military missions and humanitarian intervention. Especially within the 
military intelligence community, this insight brought about a thorough 
professionalisation and expansion of the service - including building up 
31 Buro Jansen en Jansen, De snuffelstaat: Nederland en de BVD, Amsterdam, Papieren 
Tijger, 2002, pp. 24-50, 172-176. 
32 
Wiebes C., Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnie 1992-1995. De rol van de 
inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, Amsterdam, Boom, 2002. 
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their own agent networks, partly modelled after the American 
example.33 
In the same period, another common Dutch-American security inter-
est evolved. The intelligence community in both countries increasingly 
started to worry about the so-called new trend of religious terrorism, 
emanating from the Middle East and Muslim countries. One of the first 
government agencies to break the taboo in Europe on the negative 
aspects of an easy-going integration policy was the Dutch BVD. In a 
threat analysis published in February 1992 the BVD reported on the 
danger of religious isolationist and anti-integrative tendencies within 
immigrant circles, especially amongst young, dissatisfied Muslims of 
Moroccan origin.34 It soon saw religiously-inspired terrorism organised 
by Osama bin Laden's network, sheltered by rogue states such as 
Afghanistan and Sudan, as the main terrorist threat to the Western 
world. The BVD declared itself committed to following international 
security risks back to their origins. It signalled an approach of 
"offensive prevention" and participation in international 
counterterrorism efforts. This mirrored threat assessments made by the 
CIA and FBI at that time, although it is hard to say whether political 
transfer from one country to another took place.35 
9/11: a Shared Destiny? 
The attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 sent 
shockwaves around the world. The Al Qaeda attacks catapulted interna-
tional terrorism high onto the Dutch political agenda. Abroad, the 
Netherlands were among the first supporters for Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan and sent in special forces and military intelli-
gence officers years before they started to operate within the Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force in 2006-2010.36 On the domestic front, 
the Dutch government was however hesitant in responding to this new 
challenge. In the Netherlands, counter-terrorism policy was framed 
more in relation to immigration and asylum politics. 
33 Interview with an MIVD official, May 2011. 
34 Abels P.H.A.M. and Willemse R., "Veiligheidsdienst in verandering. De BVD-
AIVD sinds het einde van de Koude Oorlog", Justitiele Verkenningen, 30, 2004, pp. 
83-98, here: p. 91; BVD, Ontwikkelingen op het gebied van de binnenlandse 
veiligheid. Taakstelling en werkwijze van de BVD, The Hague, 1992, p.25. 
35 BVD, Terrorisme aan het begin van de 21" eeuw. Dreigingsbeeld en positionering 
BVD, Leidschendarn, 2001. 
36 Dirnitriu G. and de GraafB., "The Dutch COIN-approach: Three Years in Uruzgan, 
2006-2009", Small Wars and Insurgencies, 21, September 2010, pp. 429-458. 
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However, on a structural base, the 9/11 attacks helped to accelerate 
the necessary reform of the BVD and the establishment of a new foreign 
intelligence directorate. In February 2002 a new Law on the Intelligence 
and Security Services was enacted, creating a new Foreign Intelligence 
Directorate (Directie Inlichtingen Buitenland) within the BVD, which 
was duly renamed the General Intelligence and Security Service 
(Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst: AIVD). The Foreign 
Intelligence Directorate began with 70 staff, growing to over 100 in the 
following years. The AIVD (now 1584 employees) and the military 
intelligence service MIVD (Militaire Inlichtingen en V eiligheidsdienst, 
785 employees) moreover established a national organisation for signals 
intelligence.37 This gave the services a much better intelligence position 
and helped to intensify intelligence liaison with the US again. 
Contrary to the Cold War period, transnational counter-terrorism co-
operation was predominantly stimulated within the so-called "second 
pillar" of the EU (Common Foreign and Security Policy). However, 
bilateral exchange with other partners including the US remained im-
portant. Since the Netherlands served as a transit country or temporary 
quarters for jihadi fighters and other members of Islamic terrorist net-
works with international branches, international information exchange 
was seen as being of paramount importance.38 An important condition to 
improve liaison in this domain was the Dutch ratification of the UN 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Decem-
ber 1999) on 1 January 2002 via an amendment to the Dutch Sanctions 
Act, which made sharing of data easier. In August 2004 the Dutch 
government followed the EU Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism of 13 June 2002 by announcing a Crimes of Terrorism Act. 
This new law enabled the Dutch authorities to cooperate with other 
states and intelligence agencies like the FBI to confiscate the proceeds 
of crime and prosecute the fmancing of terrorism, money laundering and 
goods related to preparing or committing a terrorist offence.39 
In 2004 the terrorist threat materialised in the Netherlands. In the 
early morning of 2 November Mohammed Bouyeri, the son of Moroc-
can immigrants, shot the controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van 
Gogh, great-grandnephew of the painter Vincent van Gogh, in an 
Amsterdam street and then murdered him with a curved machete.40 The 
37 This process had already begun some years before. See Vrijsen E., "De staat slaat 
terug", Elsevier, 2 December 2000. 
38 AIVD, Annual Report 2002, The Hague, p. 21. 
39 Ibid., p. 18. 
40 See for a more detailed account Buruma 1., Murder in Amsterdam, New York, 
Atlantic Books, 2006. 
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public shock was intense and extra funds for rising material costs and 
for more manpower to combat Islamist terrorism were released: €15m in 
2005, growing to €46m in 2009 (the total budget in 2004, when AIVD-
staff grew by more than 100 new employees, amounted to €87.5m, 
rising to €111.7m, with 150 new employees, in 2005).41 These 
institutional and structural reforms and the concrete terrorism threat 
brought the intelligence communities of the US and Europe closer 
together than they had been for some years. The re-erection of a foreign 
intelligence capability within the AIVD and the establishment of five 
permanent liaisons, including one in Washington, improved the working 
relationship between the AIVD and the American agencies.42 
However, the martial tone of the Bush administration's War on 
Terror, and the one-sided approach to counter-terrorism as taken by the 
US and its agencies, troubled the practice of intelligence liaison. In 
December 2003 right-wing parliamentary representative Geert Wilders 
had already asked the ministers of home affairs, foreign affairs and 
justice whether they could confirm the American reluctance in sharing 
intelligence with their European allies.43 Although this was denied, the 
Washington Post revealed how a lack of transatlantic intelligence coop-
eration debilitated the joint struggle against terrorism. European 
officials ascribed this lack to "a matter, in part, of culture": "They [the 
Americans] believe strongly in the need-to-know operational function, 
and they usually believe we don't need to know".44 A stunning example 
of this non-cooperative behaviour was revealed in 2008, when it became 
clear the Dutch government had expelled the CIA' s chief of station from 
the country (once again) in 2005, because he had been carrying out 
operations in the field of non-proliferation and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction within Pakistani circles in the Netherlands without inform-
ing the Dutch services. This was a classic example of how intelligence 
liaison can deteriorate, something the Dutch-American liaison suffered 
from earlier.45 
The sharpest breach with pro-American loyalty was caused by the 
war in Iraq and the series of revelations about Guantanamo Bay, extra-
legal rendition and enhanced interrogation scandals in Baghram prison 
near Kabul. It is clear that the AIVD and its military counterpart the 
41 
AIVD, Annual report 2004, The Hague, p. 69; AIVD, Annual report 2005, The 
Hague, pp. 106-107. 
42 
Wiebes, "International Intelligence Liaison", pp. 71-82. 
43 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (HTK), 4 December 2003, 
vergaderjaar 2003-2004, No. 699, pp. 1483-1483. 
44 
Farah D. and Eggen D., "Joint Intelligence Center Is Urged", Washington Post, 
21 December 2003. 
45 De Volkskrant, 12 June 2008. 
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MIVD were infuriated by the way their British and American contacts 
handled them when they distributed their reports on the alleged nuclear 
capability of the Iraqi regime. Though the AIVD and MIVD 
acknowledged that they bad a weak intelligence position on Iraq (the 
AIVD was still in the process of erecting its foreign intelligence 
department and supposedly neither of the services had a human agent in 
Iraq), they were flatly ignored when the British government sent 
confidential intelligence reports to the Dutch prime minister and his 
highest civil servant.46 Such practices are termed "stovepiping" 
(deliberately channelling intelligence and excluding certain agencies 
from the decision-making process) and it was a deliberate attempt to go 
around the AIVD's possible critique of the reports. Especially the 
intelligence liaison with the British was harmed. 47 
The Obama Administration: New Hope, New Ties? 
In a Foreign Affairs article in mid-2007 presidential candidate 
Barack Obama announced that his foreign and security policy would 
strive to "rebuild the alliances, partnerships, and institutions necessary 
to confront common threats and enhance common security".48 Richard 
Holbrooke captured this new outlook with the contention that Obama 
was committed to an open, forward looking diplomacy in response to a 
world in transition, as compared to McCain who appeared trapped in the 
past.49 Although many commentators later contended that rhetorical 
flourishes aside, the similarity between the former administration and 
the White House course under Obama was more striking than the differ-
ences, new strategic directions were indeed offered. 50 
In May 2010 President Barack Obama issued a new National Secu-
rity Strategy. In it, the White House mapped out a new strategic ap-
proach for defending American national security interests, defmed as 
"the security of the American people, a growing American economy", 
and "support for our values and an international order that is able to 
cope with 21st century challenges". In this strategy, Al Qaeda is still 
46 
47 
Davids W.J.M. et.al., Rapport Commissie van Onderzoek Besluitvorming Irak, 
Amsterdam, Boom, 2010, pp. 321-322 and p. 343. 
Scott Smith G., "Davids and Chilcot: the Long Shadow of Iraq", Atlantisch 
perspectief, 34, 2009, p. 100; Bosscher D., "Beleidsgeschiedenis in een 
snelkookpan", Openbaar Bestuur, April2010, pp. 12-16; De GraaffB., "Inlichtingen-
en veiligheidsdiensten als schaamlap", Openbaar Bestuur, April 2010, pp. 24-28. 
48 
Obama B., "Renewing American Leadership", Foreign Affairs 86, July-August ;2007. 
49 
Holbrooke R., "The Next President: Mastering a Daunting Agenda", Foreign Affairs, 
87, September-October 2008, pp. 2-24. 
50 
See Randall S., "The American Foreign Policy Transition: Barack Obama in Power", 
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 11, FaiVWinter 2008-2009, pp. 1-24. 
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seen as the most important threat to these interests. Although the Obama 
Administration no longer speaks of a War on Terror, it still views 
fighting terrorism as its utmost priority. Obama's strategy, however, 
differs in two important respects from the Bush administration. Firstly, 
the White House stressed the importance of cooperating with allies in 
countering terrorist and insurgent networks all over the world. The 
"going alone" principle would only be adopted in the last instance. 
Secondly, the counter-terrorism approach has been broadened from 
fighting the terrorists only on a military level to also preventing radicali-
sation and taking away root causes. 51 
If we consider Dutch national security priorities, especially 
regarding the terrorist threat, two developments should be stressed. 
Firstly, Dutch international and security interests continue to diverge 
from American ones, signalled by a stronger orientation towards the EU 
and a slight move away from NATO. The decades-old intelligence 
liaison continues, but it is not as multifaceted and intense as it was 
during the Cold War.52 Moreover, Dutch intelligence and security 
efforts regarding counter-terrorism have focused more on preventing 
and deradicalising on a local level than in organising counter-
insurgencies or counter-terrorism operations abroad. The so-called 
"Dutch approach" is therefore both more inclusive and more preventive 
than the American one. 53 
Secondly, despite the above, bilateral cooperation at the tactical 
level and the exchange and transfer of security threats continue to be a 
priority. Regarding the threat of international terrorism, insurgency and 
failed states, not much light exists between the Dutch and American 
threat assessment. Fighting jihadis in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, 
North-Africa, Somalia and the Arabic Peninsula is also a priority for the 
AIVD. Former head of the AIVD Gerard Bouman announced in April 
2010 that the service would concentrate on "forward defence", suggest-
ing that Dutch agents would venture deep into terrorist enclaves to pre-
emptively neutralise them before they reach the West. 54 This rather 
offensive line of national security sounded more like traditional CIA 
black ops and deviated strongly from the Dutch political line that saw a 
withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. 
51 National Security Strategy, May 2010, p. 21. 
52 Janssens R., "Het Wisselend Belang van de VS in het Nederlands Buitenlandse 
Beleid vanaf de Tweede Wereldoorlog tot op heden", powerpoint presentation, 
available at <http://www.atlcom.nl/upload/ AOCC%202011 %20Janssens.pdf> 
(accessed 1 March 2012). 
53 NCTb, Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland [Terrorist Threat Assessment for the 
Netherlands] (No. 22), August 2010, HTK, vergaderjaar 2009-2010, 29 754, No. 193. 
54 See NRC Handelsblad, 20 April2010. 
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On the other hand, the American threat perception is shifting nearer 
to the Dutch perception, as American policy makers are seriously con-
sidering the work of the AIVD on the issue of terrorist recruitment, 
since the US has experienced an emerging indigenous terrorism threat 
as well over the last five years. Dutch studies focusing on jihadi recruit-
ment in the Dutch context are seen as useful for American security 
officials, since the recruitment processes described in the Dutch studies 
have universal value and could be identified in the US as well. 55 In June 
2007, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs invited the Dutch Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 
Lidewij Ongering to explain the added value of the Dutch approach, 
involving a comprehensive linkage of authorities to "tackle the dangers 
of radicalisation and terrorism as a coherent whole". This approach 
"includes repressive measures against terrorists, but puts an equal 
emphasis on prevention". 56 
Conclusion 
The continuing security transfer and policy contacts do not entail 
that transatlantic loyalties have been restored to their Cold War heights. 
Although the Cold War liaison led to a transfer of security interests and 
the transformation of Dutch intelligence culture, the arrival of new 
generations of intelligence officers changed intelligence culture again. 
The predominant loyal attitude of Dutch intelligence officers towards 
the US was replaced by a more critical and unilateral stance. Privacy 
laws, human rights concerns and legal standards put a brake on their 
relationship with American services and agencies. The change of ad-
ministration in the US in 2008 has brought new hope for a better rela-
tionship, but so far, the misgivings about Guantanamo Bay, the extrale-
gal renditions and the hangovers from the war in Iraq have not yet been 
fully removed. 
The status of Dutch-American intelligence relations has not yet 
come under as much pressure as the German intelligence liaison in 
recent years. German public opinion has been alarmed over the 
American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the War on Terror. 
Investigative committees studied German intelligence support for 
55 
See Rosenau W., "Liaisons dangereuses? Transatlantic Intelligence Co-operation and 
the Global War on Terrorism", in Co-operating Against Terrorism: EU-US Relations 
Post September 11 - Conference Proceedings, Stockholm, Swedish National 
Defence College, 2007, pp. 31-40, here: p. 6. 
56 
Ongering L., "Homegrown Terrorism and Radicalisation in the Netherlands", 
testimony before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee, 27 June 2007, p. 6. 
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American operations in Iraq. For Berlin, intelligence cooperation wi~ 
the US has been a balancing act. Only recently, Germany once agam 
limited intelligence cooperation out of irritation over the fact that t~eir 
information was used by the CIA to carry out drone attacks agamst 
German Islamists in Waziristan, thereby indirectly implicating the 
German authorities in killing their own citizens. 57 
In short, tactical cooperation will prevail, albeit mainly ~n an ad ~oc 
base. Since the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, operatiOns shanng 
has revitalised the Dutch-American intelligence liaison. Despite the 
"four eyes community" (an operations sharing partn~rship ?e~een the 
UKUSA countries), the Dutch intelligence community mamtams very 
good bilateral operational liaison with the Americans. During t~eir 
participation in ISAF, they were even invited to join this commuru~, 
thereby broadening it to a "five eyes community".58 However, strategic 
and cultural differences persist. In the Netherlands a reluctance to 
cooperate and adopt American security assessments .and att_i~~es was 
supported by the European Parliament' s growmg cnt:J.ctsm of 
cooperation with US services in exchanging data flows. 59 • Dutch 
politician Jeanine Hennis Plasschaert earned herse~ a reputa~on . by 
resisting US demands and guiding the European Parhament to reJ:ctmg 
an EU interim agreement on banking data transfers to the US via the 
SWIFT network (as part of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program) due 
to concerns over privacy, proportionality and reciprocity. Obviously, 
intelligence liaison can only thrive if based on shared political goals, 
principles and strategies towards security tbreats.
60 
So differences persist. The Obama administration has symbolically 
tried to bridge the transatlantic gap, and tactical exchanges between the 
intelligence agencies keep their value. Nevertheless, over the course. of 
the past decades Dutch intelligence services have m?~hed ~om bemg 
loyal sentinels of the US into discerning and rather cntlcal allies. 
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